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Abstract1 - Australia assigns and allocates spectrum 
using three broad types of regulatory approaches; 
command and control, property rights and open 
access. Each approach entails numerous pros and 
cons, buttressed by uncertainties over future 
consumer demand, interference management, 
barriers to entry, and technological evolution. The 
development and commercialisation of dynamic 
spectrum access technologies (DSA) requires new 
regulatory approaches. This article discusses an array 
of intermediary, dynamically efficient spectrum 
management approaches, which may make better use 
of DSA opportunities. The article then discusses the 
practical hurdles and legal challenges posed by their 
adoption and regulation in an Australian context.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1990s, various OECD countries have 
assigned and allocated the radio spectrum to specific users and 
services using three broad regulatory regimes; command and 
control (C&C), property rights and open access. Command 
and control is a managed licensing regime in which the degree 
of user discretion with regard to service and technology 
neutrality is either nonexistent or minimal. The property rights 
regime is an exclusive licensing regime in which ‘owners’ 
have significant discretion (‘rights’) in the selection of the 
technologies and services to be deployed in their licence area. 
Property rights also encourage the creation of secondary 
markets in which spectrum can be traded or leased. The open 
access approach is an unlicensed or non-exclusive licensed 
                                                 
1 Contacts: Benoît Pierre Freyens, Lecturer, School of Economics, University 
of Wollongong, NSW 2500, Australia, and Visiting Fellow, Australian 
National University, Tel. +61-242214399, Fax: +61-242213725. Email:  
bfreyens@uow.edu.au and ben.freyens@anu.edu.au. The views presented in 
this paper are our own and are expressed as private individuals. These views 
should not be assumed to represent the views of our respective institutions. 
regime in which every user has identical usage rights provided 
they adhere to a specific set of rules and equipment standards.  
Analysts’ views and recommendations on these regulatory 
approaches differ widely. Over the years, an ‘either or’ debate 
raised by various reformist factions has raised a large number 
of relevant concerns. There is now a significant and vigorous 
literature debating the benefits and drawbacks of these three 
regulatory regimes.  
In our view this reform debate has erred, fixated on the 
need to promote either property rights and markets or open 
access regimes. Arguments have stressed the mutually 
exclusive nature of these regimes [1-5]. However, this 
polarisation of opinions is an unnecessary distraction. 
Property rights and unlicensed approaches mostly compete for 
different markets, services and devices, and should in fact 
better be viewed as complementary rather than rival 
approaches.  
A consensual view, perhaps, is that the selection of a 
regulatory regime should be carefully adapted to the 
circumstances of the services considered (e.g. underlying 
context and market, public or private good nature of the 
service, technologies used, strategic importance of innovation 
policy, etc.).  
Beyond the ideological nature of the debate, these 
regulatory approaches are also part of a wider dilemma over 
how to appropriate and distribute the rents generated by 
exclusive or semi-exclusive wireless access rights [6, 7, 5, 8]. 
The property rights regime has been particularly polemical 
among academic and policy researchers2. Although it has 
proved very successful among spectrum privatising countries3, 
numerous commentators have stressed the potential for ‘hold 
ups’ which generate idle or underused private spectrum 
legally inaccessible to other potential users. This view of 
                                                 
2 The most recent contributions to this ‘either or’ debate include Refs. [9-15, 4, 
16-18] 
3 These countries consist of Australia, Canada, El Salvador, Guatemala, New 
Zealand, the USA and, very recently, the United Kingdom. Except for 
Guatemala, which enshrined property rights in legal deeds, property rights in 
these countries are usually implicitly rather than explicitly defined.  
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private spectrum as fenced oligopolistic enclaves is not shared 
by all. For instance, Hazlett [5] recently suggested that 
nonspecific expansion of property rights may increase 
competitiveness in wireless markets - as opposed to the static 
quasi-monopolies granted through command and control. 
While this argument is empirically tested and appears valid, in 
practice it ignores that property rights regimes also generally 
provide more entrenched legal rights (such as the rights not to 
tolerate secondary access or the right to be compensated for 
relocation costs) than command and control regimes (since the 
government can always modulate by decree the desired degree 
of exclusivity). More entrenched access rights for some users 
may well reduce opportunities to fully and dynamically 
exploit idle spectrum for other users.  
Recent advances in the development and commercialisation 
of dynamic spectrum access technologies (DSA) require the 
regulatory framework to adapt flexibly to opportunities for 
greater spectrum utilisation. With DSA wireless networks, 
secondary users can access idle spectrum opportunities 
dynamically to transmit their signals whenever primary users 
do not use their licensed spectrum. .Much of the discussion 
has so far focused on uncertainties surrounding the 
commercial deployment of DSA technologies. There has also 
been much debate as to whether these technologies would 
favour a licensed or an ‘unlicensed’ approach to spectrum 
management. Although this question has been answered many 
times [19, 13, 16], it is essentially the wrong question [20]. 
This article takes a step back from the ‘either or’ 
dichotomy, which characterises much of this literature. It 
examines instead an array of intermediary—rather than 
extreme—spectrum management approaches that would be 
required to unleash the full potential of commercially 
deployable DSA technologies. The article argues that 
spectrum efficiency would be improved through the 
implementation of these intermediary approaches. 
Furthermore, we discuss the practical hurdles and legal 
challenges posed by the adoption and regulation of DSA 
technologies in order to enable new spectrum management 
regimes in an Australian context. 
The article is structured as follows: the first section presents 
the ‘trichotomic’ set of radiocommunications systems in 
Australia and the spectrum management regimes they enable. 
The second section succinctly presents a taxonomy of 
spectrum management regimes. The third section presents a 
set of dynamically efficient intermediary regimes under this 
taxonomy and records attempts to implement some of these 
regimes in Australia. The fourth section discusses which of 
these intermediary regimes would best enable the 
opportunities presented by DSA technologies. The fifth 
section discusses the state of adoption of DSA technology in 
Australia and the regulatory hurdles in adopting or 
experimenting with DSA-efficient regimes in Australia. 
   
LICENSING SPECTRUM RIGHTS IN AUSTRALIA 
Spectrum policy reforms started in the late 1980s in 
Australia, culminating in the Radiocommunications Act 1992 
(the Act) and the first auction of spectrum licences in 19974. 
The Act defines the operations of three radiocommunications 
licensing regimes; apparatus, spectrum and class licences, 
which map (imperfectly) with command and control, property 
rights and open access approaches, respectively.  
Apparatus licensing is a device-centric approach, where the 
operation of every radiocommunications device is authorised 
through a transmitter or receiver licence. Most of the time, this 
device-centric regime is highly prescriptive, specifying the 
type of service, technology and equipment standards, along 
with tight technical conditions about site, band, power, and 
emission types. The Australian Communications and Media 
Authority (ACMA) has specified different types of apparatus 
licence that generally align with service designations in the 
ITU Radio Regulations. 
However, not all apparatus licences fit the stereotype of an 
arch-rigid management regime ruled by government-fiat. For 
example, the 1993 launch of second generation (2G) GSM 
digital mobile telephone services in Australia was enabled by 
technologically flexible (but service-specific) apparatus 
licences for frequencies in the 900 MHz band. These licences 
allowed the use of any technology to provide digital mobile 
telephone services and today both 2G (GSM) and 3G 
(WCDMA) technologies are deployed in the 900 MHz band. 
Also, the Act was amended in 1995 to allow the trading of 
apparatus licences and third party operations (e.g. leasing), 
which introduced a degree of market flexibility to the system. 
Spectrum licences were introduced in the 1992 Act, and the 
first spectrum licences were issued in 1997. Spectrum licences 
confer leasehold ownership rights to licensees for fixed terms 
of 15 years. Overall, these spectrum licences cover a relatively 
small portion of the entire spectrum, but include the most 
highly valued bands. There are currently about 10 spectrum 
licensed bands.  
Spectrum licences are typically ‘service-neutral’ and ‘space-
centric’. They permit users to operate any 
radiocommunications devices in a given ‘spectrum space’5 
subject to respecting the requirements of a technical 
framework. Core conditions of the spectrum licence specify 
the band, the area, and the maximum permitted level of radio 
emissions outside its boundaries. Other conditions specify 
which transmitters are required to be registered to certify they 
will not cause unacceptable levels of interference outside the 
boundaries of the licence. Advisory guidelines assist 
                                                 
4 Note that there were auctions of apparatus licences as early as 1994 and 1995.  
5 A spectrum space is a large band specified in terms of its underlying area, 
population density, terrain, prospective services and interference rights 
(receiver and transmitter). Once fully specified, the spectrum space allows a 
higher degree of freedom in usage and is generally favoured by large operators. 
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interference assessments between spectrum licensed devices 
and services operating under apparatus or class licences.  
Spectrum licences have added much flexibility to 
radiocommunications management in Australia. But there are 
several areas of controversy such as licence renewal 
uncertainty and spectrum idleness in several spectrum-
licensed bands. For example, spectrum licenses in the 500 
MHz band (two way radio) have been little used, and some 
spectrum licenses in the lower 800 MHz band (mobile 
phones), 2.3 GHz and 3.6 GHz bands (broadband and 
WiMAX) have seen no or little network deployment. 
Class licensing is a technology-centric approach to 
spectrum management that operates on an open and shared 
access basis. Class licences do not need to be applied for or 
issued to individuals, and in that sense are the equivalent of 
‘unlicensed’ approaches in other countries. There is no 
exclusivity in usage and no fee to be paid. For these reasons, 
class licences are sometimes referred to as ‘public parks’ or 
‘open access’ regimes. A class licence sets out some minimal 
operational conditions, which can include band, power, types 
of device and emissions, standards compliance, and 
geographic deployment constraints. Many class licences 
operate as non-interfering secondary usage easements in 
apparatus licensed bands or within shared bands such as ISM 
bands.  
Since class licences are not issued to individuals, the 
licence conditions are not applied nor tailored to individual 
users. Class licences do not lapse, they continue until they are 
revoked or amended. Transmissions under class licensees are 
not allowed to interfere with other services and are not 
provided protection from interferences generated by other 
services. Thus, the spectrum access and usage rights granted 
through this regime are relatively basic and generally 
unsuitable for larger radiocommunications operators, such as 
telecommunications carriers with long-term infrastructure 
projects and quality of service obligations to their customers. 
The services and devices authorised under class licences are 
usually restricted to short-range, low-power applications. 
The early liberalisation of spectrum access in Australia 
through spectrum and class licensing regimes has proved very 
successful, enabling the flexible adoption of numerous 
wireless innovations and a fast spread of broadband services 
[16]. 
 
THE MULTI-DIMENSIONAL REGULATORY SPACE 
Taken together, these three licensing regimes allow the 
ACMA to provide flexible management responses to a large 
array of demands put on the spectrum. After all, due to its 
geographical isolation and its strong commitment to 
management reforms Australia has been at the forefront of 
spectrum management liberalisation for nearly two decades. 
The vigorous reform policies pursued by the SMA6, the ACA 
and now the ACMA have transformed old bureaucratic rules 
into one of the most economically efficient, flexible and 
transparent licensing systems in the world.  
Yet, there are still important challenges facing spectrum 
management policy in Australia. On the one hand there are 
limitations to the licensing regimes currently used and on the 
other hand the fast pace of technological development requires 
a continuous re-think of past arrangements and anticipation of 
future needs. The more flexible, adaptable and responsive the 
licensing structure is in meeting these challenges, the better 
the potential to fully exploit the regimes’ potential, and 
efficiently deliver socio-economic benefits.  
The three licensing regimes set out the rights and 
obligations of spectrum users in Australia. Although the 
licensing regimes differ in many respects, they also have 
common denominators. For instance, they all impose a 
minimal set of ‘core’ specifications about frequency, 
bandwidth, area, power and emission types, although the way 
these conditions are integrated in practice does vary. In 
general, apparatus and spectrum licensing have more in 
common than class licensing. Both provide some degree of 
exclusivity and interference protection in spectrum access 
rights. Both licences can be auctioned, leased or traded, and 
are subject to regulatory approval for licence renewal - though 
on very different terms.  
Table I below illustrates the typical features of each 
licensing regime as a set of specific coordinates in a multi-
dimensional space7.  
 
TABLE I 
AUSTRALIAN LICENSING REGIMES - MAIN DIMENSIONS
Attributes Apparatus Lic. Spectrum Lic. Class Lic. 
Regime focus Device-centric Space-centric Tech-centric 
Exclusivity Medium to High Very high None 
Neutrality (T, S) None to Moderate Hi High variable 
Assignment by Admin P, Auction Auction Not assigned 
Individual assigned Yes or No Yes No 
Price / Fee Admin P / market P Market P None 
Tenure and Term 5 years/renewable 15 years Unlimited 
Interference protect. Provided Provided Not provided 
Rights certainty Moderate High Low 
Tradability Moderate High Not relevant 
Sub-division Not allowed Allowed Not relevant 
Coordination needed High High Low 
Coordination by Regulator Licensee Tech-governed
Service neutrality Usually none High High or low 
Technical conditions Basic Complex Basic 
(T,S) stands for  Technology and Service neutrality ; P stands for Price. 
 
                                                 
6 The Spectrum Management Authority (SMA) was merged with the Australian 
Telecommunications Authority (AUSTEL) on 1 July 1997 to form the 
Australian Communications Authority (ACA), later to become the ACMA 
after merging with the Australian Broadcasting Authority (ABA) in 2005. 
7 Note that some apparatus and class licences will not correspond to this 
depiction, which, instead, attempts to describe representative licences. 
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Although the table focuses on 15 important dimensions, 
potentially, the number of dimensions characterising any 
spectrum management regime is much larger. By changing the 
coordinates taken by any regime in the multi-dimensional 
space (say replacing ‘high’ by ‘low’ degree of), one obtains 
theoretically another regime. Table I therefore suggests the 
existence of a near infinity of spectrum management regimes. 
Many of these potential regimes would present limited or no 
interest to regulators, but others would be of interest in 
specific situations. Clearly, there are more than just three 
options on the table. 
Working with 15 dimensions is however not practical. 
Intermediary licensing regimes could be defined based on four 
key dimensions presented in table I [21, 22].  
Service and Technological Neutrality, reflects the degree of 
licensee discretion in deciding which services to provide on 
the band, and in selecting and setting equipments standards. In 
Australia, several dynamic regimes are technology-neutral but 
service-rigid in practice. Neutrality is allocative efficient [5, 
23] but may reduce technical efficiency by making 
coordination with other technologies difficult. 
Band Exclusivity, describes the degree of exclusivity 
conferred to licensee rights. For instance, a very exclusive 
regime allows licensees (primary users) to negate access to 
any potential secondary users (right of exclusion). A very 
exclusive regime would also be expected to confer a high 
degree of rights certainty to licensees. 
Rights Assignment, refers to the mechanism by which the 
selected regime transfers rights to licensees; price mechanisms 
(e.g. auctions), administrative pricing, arbitrary fees, or no 
assignment. This dimension might also distinguish between 
rights assigned to an individual entity or to a community at 
large.  
Rules Coordination, determines the authority to set rules 
and protocols for efficient interference management. All 
licensing regimes require a minimum set of rules to keep 
interferences under check, but some regimes will grant a large 
degree of autonomy to licensees or users, other will rely on 
the legal system, and other still will rely on government 
authority.  
Transferrability and liability, refers to the possibility to 
trade or lease frequencies. This dimension will include 
different variants of liability towards the regulator (and 
eventual harmed third parties) in case licenses are misused. In 
case the licenses are leased, this will range from the transfer of 
all liability to the lessee to keeping full responsibility for the 
use of the band with the lessor. 
Following this nomenclature, the property rights regime 
consists of service neutral licenses and sharply defined 
exclusivity rights. Easements for secondary usage are subject 
to owners’ approval and may need to be purchased. 
Interferences are managed among owners within a set of legal 
and technical rules. Expropriation would require due 
compensation. Licenses are fully transferrable and residual 
liability rights will be negotiated with the primary user. 
Open access lies at the other end; no exclusivity rights, self-
management of interferences under minimal government 
guidelines. Service and technology neutrality are tolerated to 
the extent that they remain compatible with the interference 
coordination rules (which may for instance require 
compatibility in technological standards). Licenses are not 
individually assigned nor can they be traded or leased. 
 
DYNAMICALLY EFFICIENT INTERMEDIARY REGIMES 
This simple model allows defining a set of dynamically 
efficient intermediary regimes for instance combining aspects 
of a property rights regime, with those of a C&C or an open 
access regime, as summarised in Table II. For instance, a 
common pool is a community of users operating under 
conditions of service and technological neutrality in a given 
spectrum band. The spectrum is shared access within the 
community, but rights are collectively-owned (and so more 
exclusive than under open access) and coordination rules are 
set and enforced by community management. If membership 
and sharing rules are decided by government, the regime may 
be described as collective command and control. 
 
TABLE II 
DYNAMICALLY EFFICIENT INTERMEDIARY REGIMES 
Regime Neutrality Rights Assignment Rules 
Private Commons Flexible FPR AT SC 
Private Parks Flexible FPR AT SC 
Public park Flexible CU UB GM 
Collective C&C Rigid RCU AL GM 
Common pool Flexible RCU AL/UB SC 
Easement Flexible EPR AT GM 
Market easement Flexible EPR AT SC 
Regulated easement Rigid EPR AT GM 
Eased C&C Rigid EPR AL/AT GM 
Flexi-eased C&C Flexible EPR AL/AT GM 
  Transferability Australian Examples 
Private commons High : 
Private parks High : 
Public park None class licences 
Collective C&C Low Non assigned apparatus licences 
Common pool Low : 
Easement Medium MOST radio telescope on 843 MHz 
Market easement High Authorised under spectrum licences 
Regulated easement Medium Auctioned apparatus licences  
Eased C&C Medium Most apparatus licences 
Flexi-eased C&C Variable Some class and apparatus licenses 
C&C = Command and Control; FPR = Full property rights; EPR = Eased property 
rights, RCU = Restricted collective use, AL = Administrative licensing; AT = 
Auctioned licences and market trading; UB = Unlicensed band; SC = Self-controlled, 
GM = Government managed
 
A private commons is a similar arrangement worked out 
through a contract between the community of users and the 
band owner. A private park regime is a membership-based, 
fee-based licensing approach relying on device registration 
and self-coordination rules by users. In its operations, the 
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private park is somewhat closer to a commons than a property 
rights regime, yet rights are individually rather than 
collectively owned.  
An easement is a situation by which the government 
enforces secondary usage rights over the flexible rights held 
by primary users (e.g. telecommunications carriers). A 
regulated easement is a similar situation but in a context of 
service and technological rigidity such as where primary 
users’ rights derive from a C&C regime. A market easement 
let these secondary rights be negotiated through markets rather 
than through government intervention. 
C&C regimes can also be re-packaged, say to tolerate non-
interfering easements for secondary users (Eased C&C) or 
grant service-neutral usage (Flexible C&C, similar to the 
regime governing the ‘GSM’ licences in the 900 MHz band 
discussed above) or both (flexi-eased C&C).  
It is notable from Table II that Australia has most used 
intermediate regimes where government is the primary or a 
significant rule maker. These are enabled by different rules 
surrounding apparatus and class licensing. There has been a 
much narrower range of regimes used where the private sector 
has taken the lead. Theoretically spectrum licensing could 
enable many different regimes under private control. In 
practice, spectrum licensees have operated large systems and 
allowed very little or no use by third parties. The reasons have 
been much debated and have lead to several attempted 
expansions of the set of regulatory approaches.   
For example, in 2001, the ACA made a submission to a 
Government inquiry [24], suggesting consolidation of the 3 
licensing regimes authorised under the Act into one generic 
licence type. The generic licence would have enabled the 
ACA to build bespoke licences ensuring best fit between user, 
service and band [25]. This suggestion was not adopted 
although it was consistent with the object of the Act (as well 
as with the Principles for Spectrum Management that the 
ACMA adopted in 2009), which emphasizes both the quest for 
high-value allocation and efficient band usage. 
Later on, and in order to increase dynamic efficiency in 
some frequency bands, the ACMA suggested issuing ‘private 
park’ licences for wireless access services (WAS). Future 
WAS needs seemed suited to a service-neutral regime 
authorizing any number and type of interoperable base 
stations in a licensed space with band coordination undertaken 
by users – in short a regime combining aspects of spectrum 
and class licensing. The ACMA contemplated issuing shared-
use licences directly to users8. Furthermore, devices would be 
expected to use dynamic frequency selection techniques in 
                                                 
8 Note that spectrum licenses in principle authorise their owners to operate a 
similar regime, since spectrum spaces can be subdivided, and traded or leased 
to third parties on owners’ conditions. However, the private park is initiated by 
government, and seeks commons-like coordination rules within the park rather 
than hierarchical property-based rules. Such a regime has not arisen under the 
management freedoms granted spectrum licenses. 
similar fashion to class-licensed devices. Finally, there would 
be no seniority privileges, and no ‘hard’ licence boundaries - 
although base stations would have to be sited within the 
geographical area of the licence. 
Since the enforcement of easements for secondary users in 
spectrum licensed space is effectively prohibited under the 
Act (even when the spectrum is permanently left idle by its 
owners), the private park regime was meant to induce more 
dynamic operations in what are currently spectrum-licensed 
spaces. In a Private Park, the definition of shared rights should 
induce users of similar size and background to coordinate and 
self-manage their services on different geographical spectrum 
spaces within the band [26, 27]. Although there is still 
regulatory interest in the potential for private parks to be a 
dynamically-efficient response to future WAS needs, Private 
Park arrangements have not yet been developed or 
implemented in Australia.  
 
DSA TECHNOLOGIES, PROPERTY RIGTHS  AND COMMONS 
DSA technologies consist of a motley array of spectrum 
sharing techniques, driven by digital signal processing . The 
better known examples are (i) spread-spectrum and Ultra-
Wide Band technologies, which spread non-sinusoidal signals 
over a wide frequency range at very lower power per 
frequency band, (ii) smart antennae, which represent an 
intelligent spectrum re-use technology cancelling 
interferences by spatial coding, (iii) software-defined radios, 
which process signals through general processors and can thus 
receive and transmit various types of waveforms by using 
different softwares (e.g. automatic frequency selection in 
modern radios), and (iv) cognitive radio, which builds on SDR 
technology to sense idle spectrum, analyses the vacant slot 
and its environment to decide whether to occupy it (in a ‘listen 
before talk’ logic) and once a decision is made, the radio 
guides prospective signals towards the unused spectrum. 
It has often been argued in the policy literature on spectrum 
management that DSA technologies (often referred to as ‘the 
technology’) represent a great promise to expand the open 
access regime to much larger shares of the radio spectrum 
than it currently occupies [28, 29, 12]. In that perspective, 
open access is a dynamically superior regime to property 
rights, because the latter is inherently dynamically inefficient 
by force of being too exclusive and therefore entailing high 
transaction costs for secondary usage. Incorporating power 
limits and listen-before-talk protocols into the hardware 
reduces transaction costs between negotiating parties to their 
bare minimum. Open access and collective ownership also 
induce collaboration and generally offer much more 
favourable terrain for innovation [30]. Without commercially 
deployable DSA technologies though, the threat of 
interference and ‘tragedy of the commons’ outcomes is 
conspicuous for higher power services such as broadcasting 
and WAS where there is a need for coordination to minimise 
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interference. There is general agreement that open access is 
currently a very successful way to manage short-range, low-
power applications. However, suitably designed and 
commercially operational DSA technologies are a necessary 
condition to expand open access to different types of 
applications. 
Economists and other proponents of the property rights 
regime argue that open access is therefore too dependent on 
the promise of DSA technologies9. Cognitive radio technology 
still has to clear important barriers if it is to contribute 
significantly to dynamic spectrum usage. The difficulties of 
sensing idle spectrum in the presence of geophysical 
obstacles, the ‘hidden terminal’ issue, doubts about the cost-
effectiveness of these technologies,10 indicate just how 
complex the way ahead is. As is well known, software-defined 
radio technologies have been discovered and used by the US 
Military for many decades. The fact that they are filtering very 
slowly and very selectively from the military to the civilian 
domain and are still not widely available for most civilian 
radiocommunications applications illustrates the uncertainties 
for regulatory planning.  
Ultra Wide Band is a much less complex matter since the 
technology is available and already operational in many 
places, usually under an unlicensed arrangement (i.e. a class 
licence in Australia). However the matter of interference with 
devices operated under other technologies in a confined space 
remains open. Past controversies about the legally acceptable 
noise floor of UWB devices have generated a lengthy legal 
process for UWB authorisation in the US [32]. Australia, New 
Zealand and EU countries have since authorised some UWB 
applications especially for imaging, vehicular radar and home-
networking applications. Higher power applications such as 
ground-breaking radar remain in doubt. Yet, the relative 
success of UWB technology does not solve much. Because it 
trades so much power for bandwidth, UWB applications are 
short-range, just like Wi-Fi, and so UWB provides no gateway 
for an open access regime of a very different nature to Wi-Fi. 
In particular it offers little promise for high power 
communications applications. 
Without ready-to-use DSA technologies, open access does 
not represent a credible solution beyond the short-range 
devices it currently authorises. What is more, even if DSA 
technologies were fully operational, the very strength of 
demand for wireless applications is growing at such a pace 
                                                 
9 Note that the inverse argument is often heard in the industry. According to 
this view, the commercial deployment of DSA technologies will only become 
interesting with the regulatory organization of a spectrum management system 
that is heterogeneous and dynamic rather than one that is homogeneous and 
proprietary. We contrast these views in the next section. 
10 See  for instance [31]  p. 7-13 and [13] p. 265 for a discussion. Most of these 
problems have solutions but they require some kind of return to command and 
control type interventions. 
that DSA technologies would only realistically offer a short-
term patch-up to current bottlenecks.  
By contrast economists emphasise that the property rights 
approach efficiently does solve excess demand through 
pricing and access rationing. Assuming the price mechanism 
operates without distortions, these instruments guarantee that 
excess demand remains under check (market imperfections 
leading to price distortions remaining the matter of 
government regulation).  
Furthermore, the property rights approach can also make 
efficient use of DSA technologies, as these technologies 
enable spectrum owners inclined on spectrum trading to find 
more efficient ways to let secondary users access and use their 
bands. Gerald Faulhaber neatly concluded this argument by 
stressing that ‘[DSA] technology is neutral regarding the 
overarching legal regime’ ([13] p. 268).  
Economists have also questioned whether Wi-Fi and similar 
unlicensed experiments might not in fact represent a 
repackaged property rights approach in which rights are 
defined over the coverage range, with large operators (e.g. 
universities or airports) securing exclusive rights over specific 
areas [33, 16]. In that sense, unlicensed approaches do not 
quite provide open access, but merely redefines access rights 
in a different way. 
These arguments and counter-arguments have led to a 
stalemate between partisans of the most dynamically efficient 
solution and those of the most economically rational (and 
allocative efficient) solution. However, this debate has almost 
turned satirical. Even without DSA technologies, open access 
has indeed proved successful in some areas (e.g. Wi-Fi on 2.4 
GHz) but disappointing or disastrous in others (e.g. US U-
PCS bands on 1.9 GHz, or U-NII bands on 5.2 GHz and many 
more). Similarly, the property rights regime in Australia has 
seen significant network deployment and spectrum trading on 
ITU designed mobile phone bands (800 MHz, 900 MHz11, 1.8 
GHz and 2.0 GHz). Other bands have shown significant 
trading, but band idleness has been quite common. Licensees 
in all bands have shown an almost universal reluctance to 
allow secondary use [22, 34].  
It seems the property rights approach has not so far 
provided an avenue for dynamically efficient spectrum usage 
by multiple users. The experience in Australia is that spectrum 
licences (which confer property rights12) have generally been 
quite successful in technical and allocative terms, but they 
proved to be very monolithic. They occupy large portions of 
spectrum in very exclusive ways. Although spectrum licences 
                                                 
11 As stressed earlier, the 900 MHz band has not been spectrum licensed and 
represents a unique example of Flexi C&C regime, with some degree of 
technological neutrality and similar trading and leasing rights to spectrum 
licenses, albeit with much less formal certainty in the duration of the access 
rights. 
12 Legal scholars might dispute that leasehold constitutes property since it that 
regime, the ultimate owner remains the Government. 
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were designed as a tool to allow market function, the large 
spectrum-licensed spaces they control are monopolised by the 
high spectrum-consuming technologies deployed on these 
bands. Can licensees realistically be expected to allow large 
amounts of secondary use, while their primary goal is to 
guarantee a quality of service for their prime network? Under 
these conditions, some degree of regulatory action may be 
needed to increase the yield of spectrum-licensed spaces by 
allowing non-interfering secondary usage by low-power, 
spread-spectrum or UWB devices. This suggests an important 
role for intermediate legal regimes to allow DSA 
technologies. The challenge for regulators is to set up 
intermediate regimes that retain the benefits of a market 
driven property-rights approach for the primary allocation. 
 
DSA TECHNOLOGIES AND ALTERNATIVE REGIMES 
DSA technologies are a plus for any management regime. 
The question is which regime presents the best environment 
for their full use. We argue in this article that intermediary 
regimes would better respond to this promise because they are 
focused on improved access (thus addressing the matter of 
exclusivity and idleness) while still limiting the number of 
users in various different ways (thus addressing the matter of 
congestion and tragedy of the commons).  
By contrast, the problems of excessive exclusivity and low 
usage that can be presented by a property rights are not 
resolved by DSA technology. If an owner is opposed to 
secondary usage because she does not accept that managing 
other users is part of her core business, the presence of new 
technologies may do little to change her resolve.  
Similarly, the problems of excessive interference, 
overcrowding and quality of service under an unlicensed 
(class licensed) approach may not be solved for long with the 
adoption of properly working DSA technologies. 
Additionally, there are many situations where tragedy of the 
commons can arise even with properly working DSA 
technologies—see for instance ‘greedy design’ arguments 
discussed in Refs. [35, 36]. Unlicensed approaches raise 
issues of compliance with shared-used policies, of secondary 
usage coexistence with primary licensees, and the potential 
matter of technological supremacy (e.g. the WiMax debate).  
The importance of having as many alternatives available to 
manage the spectrum in a dynamically efficient way is well 
recognised by most experts. In his discussion of the standard 
government-imposed easement model suggested in ref. [37], 
Martin Cave recently stressed that ‘it is unlikely that there will 
be a corner solution with the same regime optimal in all 
frequencies’ ([19] p. 230). Other proponents of the property 
rights approach would agree. William Baumol and Dorothy 
Robyn for instance add that ‘any good rules will have to be 
readily changeable as demand, used, technology and any other 
critical determinants evolve in unpredictable ways…Rather , 
redesign of the current spectrum governance regime has been 
discussed in terms of the choices between two fundamentally 
different alternatives’ ([33] p. 3).  
Intuitively wireless applications that require guaranteed 
spectrum access at very short notice (e.g. emergency services) 
will require a different treatment than services operated on a 
continuous basis (e.g. broadcasting), or those that require 
guarantees of long-term access to justify large investments in 
infrastructure and market development (e.g. third and fourth 
generation  networks). There is an endless list of services, 
technologies, users and markets all with different priorities 
and requiring different types of rights. 
Thus, what this debate misses is recognition that there are 
many more choices than just open access and property rights, 
that these additional regimes are an important addition to the 
debate, and that they also can make optimal use of the 
opportunities offered by DSA technologies. Since these 
regimes are inherently more dynamically efficient, by 
encouraging an increased number of users on any given band, 
it would be intuitive that their combination with a set of 
operational DSA technologies would conduce to better 
economic outcomes. What benefit is a technology such as 
cognitive radio if it is not used due to a legal impasse (say 
because a spectrum owner is concerned for the quality of 
service of its networks), or if demand is such that the spectrum 
is permanently congested? 
Intermediary regimes show the way ahead to remedy these 
likely shortcomings, and they are all well designed to make 
best use of DSA technology. For instance, if spectrum owners 
such as 3G network operators were required (rather than 
merely authorised at the moment) to manage their spectrum as 
a private commons, it is likely that this would take place by 
widespread adoption of spread spectrum and UWB 
technologies, since, as discussed earlier the amount of 
bandwidth required to operate a 3G network would leave little 
room for secondary users (except for less dense geographical 
areas, where traffic can be quiet for long periods of time). 
Cognitive radio would be just as welcome since the large 
bandwidth needed in a 3G network is nonetheless not 
permanently used, nor in all geographical locations.  
This could be done under an easement model by providing 
legislation that allows non-interfering devices to operate under 
a certain noise floor level, as was the case with UWB in the 
US. This process can prove controversial (and has been in the 
US where no real property rights existed).  
A softer approach is to encourage the establishment of 
private commons. How does one induce a spectrum owner to 
run a private commons? Regulators may create a structure of 
private incentives such as a scale of rights based on spectrum 
usage (low usage implying later demotion to a lesser rights 
regime). On this basis, a spectrum owner that makes little use 
of the resource can nevertheless keep ownership rights by 
operating a private commons. A private commons would 
differ from an easement model in that the owner selects 
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secondary users rather than have coexistence imposed by 
regulatory rule. Alternatively, if these reforms prove 
intractable, the Government may want to keep some spectrum 
licences for itself to encourage the development of private 
commons.  
The private park is a different matter, since the requirement 
to collaborate with different users is in-built from the start, 
and is therefore not premised on any easement conditions. A 
private park licensee would know up-front that its shared-
space licence would make optimal use of the spectrum 
through sharing between co-owners and extensive use of DSA 
technology. In the private park, idle spectrum detected, say by 
cognitive radio, can be readily used since the individual 
licences would authorise shared use. Devices registration and 
an upper limit on the number of park owners (based on 
underlying market for the likely services and population 
density in the geographical area considered) would help 
guarantee quality of service. The common pool approach does 
not differ markedly from the private parks as far as the use of 
DSA technologies is concerned, the main difference residing 
in joint rights ownership rather than shared private rights. 
Public parks and device parks by contrast are quite widely 
operated for services that are not severely affected by quality 
of services issues. They are often conflated with the open 
access regime (which assumes much less regulatory 
intervention than observed in these parks). They make 
intensive use of spectrum sharing technologies on a 
coexistence basis, i.e. equipments are built to avoid 
interferences but in most cases devices do not communicate 
with each other. 
Finally, eased and flexi-eased C&C regimes also facilitate 
the adoption and the potential use of DSA technologies, by 
preserving some degree of regulatory discretion to introduce 
spectrum sharing in bands that are mostly fallow. Because 
users rights are less extensive and less certain than under 
property rights, these regimes are less ideal for services 
requiring important infrastructure investment. 
Two fundamental features define each of these intermediary 
regimes; (i) whether they are premised on collaboration or 
coexistence, and (ii) whether users are endowed equal or 
hierarchically-defined rights [38]. The private commons is 
collaborative but hierarchical while the private park is 
collaborative but egalitarian.  Similarly, the coexistence of the 
public park is egalitarian while the coexistence of the 
easement model is hierarchical.  The eased and flexi-eased 
models are also hierarchical.   
Collaborative models will require much stronger sharing 
protocols (and institutions to enforce them) than, say, the 
current equipment standards used for Wi-Fi. And so 
collaborative approaches will be harder to integrate with DSA 
technologies than coexistence models. Egalitarian approaches 
will be more flexible and more dynamic than hierarchically-
defined regimes because they reduce or remove the 
authorisation requirements of the latter, but they should be 
restricted to services with limited users to mitigate against 
tragedy of the commons outcomes, and where quality of 
service is not a major issue. 
 
PRACTICAL IMPEDIMENTS TO REGULATING DSA 
TECHNOLOGIES IN AUSTRALIA 
The emergence of DSA technologies provides a challenge 
to the Australian radiocommunications licensing system set up 
by the passage of the 1992 Act. The Act provides sufficient 
flexibility for the regulator to licence DSA technologies in 
some circumstances but a more comprehensive licensing 
toolbox may enable better solutions.  
To provide an example of legal/regulatory hurdles facing 
regulators in the usage of DSA technologies (beyond 
authorisation issues), consider the following hypothetical case. 
Theoretically ACMA can issue class licences on a band prior 
to the band being specified for spectrum licensing. The design 
of the class licence may well be based on assumption about 
cognitive radio developments over the next 15 years. Yet, 
once the band is specified for spectrum licensing, it becomes 
very difficult to for the ACMA to amend the class licence 
because the Act significantly constrains the ability of the 
ACMA to do so once a band is specified for spectrum 
licensing13. So, if cognitive radio happens to behave 
differently than expected there may be several long-term 
regulatory problems to solve (e.g. spectrum licensees 
complaining about not having the usage rights – such as 
quality of service rights – they expected to obtain). 
The widespread adoption of DSA technologies may well 
require a re-think of the entire system of registering licences 
and assigning new services. The regulator maintains the 
licence register to contain all the data required to assign new 
licences so that they do not interfere with existing services. 
Searchable fields, including centre frequency, bandwidth and 
site location allow almost automatic frequency assignment of 
traditional radiocommunications services. However, as 
currently specified, the register does not contain all details that 
would be needed to assign systems (whether DSA or not) in a 
DSA environment. While DSA systems are a rarity over most 
of the spectrum, they can be accommodated as exceptions, but 
greater sophistication will be required as DSA becomes 
common.  
A third regulatory challenge arising from the widespread 
adoption of DSA technologies will be the pricing of spectrum. 
More sophisticated auction methodologies may be required to 
efficiently allocate spectrum for use by DSA technologies and 
systems that do not absolutely deny spectrum to other services 
but do impose constraints on those other services. 
Administratively set prices also will need to be set in a more 
                                                 
13 Strictly speaking, frequency bands are either designated or declared for 
spectrum licensing depending on the particular legislative pathway used. 
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sophisticated way to allow for the impact of DSA 
technologies and systems. 
 
INTERMEDIATE REGIMES UNDER CURRENT LEGISLATION 
The dynamically efficient intermediate regimes identified 
earlier may be licensed in the following ways in Australia. 
 
TABLE III 
LICENSING INTERMEDIARY REGIMES IN AUSTRALIA 
Regime Licence system Ownership Current status 
Private commons spectrum common allowed-unused 
Private parks spectrum single allowed-unused 
Public park class .. commonly used 
Collective C&C apparatus common commonly used 
Common pool apparatus/class common unused 
Easement spectrum single partly allowed 
Market easement spectrum easement rarely used 
Regulated easement spectrum easement commonly used 
Eased C&C apparatus easement commonly used 
Flexi-eased C&C apparatus easement commonly used 
 
The private commons regime ideally arises when a group of 
access seekers collectively own a spectrum space and operate 
within it according to rules of there own devising. However, a 
private commons has not been tried in Australia. There has 
been no interest from spectrum users and there are doubts 
about the practical aspects of property rights to spectrum held 
by tenants in common basis. However, the regime is allowed 
by the Act; it just requires a coalition to jointly purchase a 
spectrum licence and run it as a commons. 
A private park is a similar concept, but where ownership of 
a spectrum licence is held by a single licensee (which may be 
collectively owned), which operates access on commons 
basis. This is allowed under the current regime; it requires a 
licensee to issue third party authorisations to other spectrum 
users. There has been no take up of this approach in Australia 
with anecdotal reports that spectrum licensees are reluctant to 
enter into third party authorisations. 
Interestingly, it is the case that the apparatus licence 
arrangements in the 2.5 GHz band and the collaborative 
operational practices of the television broadcasters who hold 
those licences have arguably produced an outcome that has 
some of the attributes of the private commons and private park 
regimes. 
A market easement is an easement to a spectrum licence 
where the details of the easement are controlled by the 
spectrum licensee. This is allowed in Australia by way of 
third-party authorisations to spectrum licences. The degree to 
which this type of arrangement is used is not known  but many 
access seekers have reported dissatisfaction with the 
difficultly of negotiating such arrangements. The ACMA has 
identified impediments to third party authorisations, which it 
is addressing.  
Collective command and control is commonly used, for 
example in non assigned apparatus licences. Public parks are 
the extensively used class licensing regime. 
Different types of easement to a spectrum property right 
regime are allowed under current legislation, although few of 
them allow to ‘enforce’ an easement upon a spectrum 
licensees. For instance, the ACMA is allowed to issue 
apparatus licences in spectrum designated for spectrum 
licensing under special circumstances; or to defence, law 
enforcement and emergency personnel. In the normal course 
of events an access seeker to an easement to a spectrum 
licence is expected to negotiate a third party authorisation 
from the primary licensee. The alternative, of an easement by 
way of an apparatus licence under special circumstances has 
been used in a small number of cases such as short-term trials 
of equipment. 
Class licences issued before spectrum licensing processes 
commence are also able to continue after spectrum licences 
are issued but this approach has not been used by the ACMA.  
Collective command and control arrangements are used 
extensively in Australia. Here flexible rights are granted for 
restricted collective use under an administrative licence. 
Apparatus licences are granted for two-way radio systems that 
can be used anywhere in Australia (or in a State). The service 
is not flexible, but the technology can vary, digital or analogue 
for example, provided the channel width is adhered to. Many 
systems are licensed on each channel used for this purpose 
and licensees are expected to coordinate with one another on a 
no interference no protection basis. These licences are 
commonly held by companies that provide two way radio 
services to sporting or cultural events. 
The related common pool regime, where coordination rules 
are set and enforced by community management has not been 
used in Australia. 
A regulated easement is an easement under a command and 
control licensing arrangement. This is a quite common 
arrangement. Class licences are issued underneath apparatus 
licensed bands, with usually only power restrictions on the 
operation of devices under the class licence. 
Eased command and control and flexi-eased command and 
control are also common in Australia. The degree of neutrality 
in both apparatus and class licences can vary considerably, 
and both allow easements. For example, a class licence may 
specify both a power level and a service (e.g. wireless 
microphones or only a power level). An apparatus licence may 
specify a service and a technology, or only a service. 
 
EXTENT OF USE OF DSA TECHNOLOGIES IN AUSTRALIA  
The extent of DSA technology use in Australia is currently 
limited. The Jindalee over-the-horizon radar is a high profile 
example. This system developed in Australia for defence and 
security purposes roams over the HF band avoiding 
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interference to some users on a dynamic basis and avoiding 
sensitive bands all together. 
UWB for ground penetrating radar has been authorised by a 
non assigned apparatus licence. The licensing of these systems 
posed a number of problems for the Australian regulator. 
These systems operated over bands designated for spectrum 
licensing and legislation prevented them from being 
authorised by a class licence. Apparatus licences could have 
been issued to individual licensees but would have had to pass 
the test in legislation of being special circumstances to coexist 
with the spectrum licences. Also the current apparatus licence 
fee schedule does not make allowance for sharing, and the 
standard formula, where fees are proportional to bandwidth, 
would have resulted in a very high fee.  
The fee formula causes other distortions to the way systems 
are licensed. Space licences for communicating with satellites 
are sometimes issued to a company that leases transponder 
capacity on a satellite owned by a foreign operator, which for 
reasons of its own does not wish to apply for licences itself. 
The licensee may only use 27 MHz bandwidth at any one time 
but the centre frequency may vary over 500 MHz, depending 
on the transponder used. These are typically licensed as a 
27 MHz band width system, with a frequency at the centre of 
the 500 MHz range. This provides an appropriate fee, but it 
provides little guidance to the actual frequencies used. If this 
practice became widespread with DSA technologies, the use 
of the register of licences for frequency assigning would 
rapidly diminish. 
A number of DSA technologies, such as cognitive channel 
selecting technologies, are already authorised by class 
licences. Examples include WiFi, DECT cordless telephone 
systems, RLAN point-to-point backhaul links used to connect 
RLAN and broadband networks to other networks on 5.8 
GHz, as well as biomedical telemetry technologies such as 
medical implant devices operating on a number of bands 
under the Low Interference Potential Devices (LIPD) Class 
License. 
 
AUSTRALIA’S REGULATORY READINESS FOR DSA 
The readiness of the Australian regime to deal with the 
extensive use of DSA technologies is like the proverbial 
curate’s egg—good in parts and therefore unsatisfactory as a 
whole. Consequently, it needs reviewed in its entirety to 
provide the most efficient regulatory outcomes. 
The apparatus and class licensing regimes can be readily 
adapted to deal with DSA technologies. In deciding whether 
to issue an apparatus licence, the Act specifies that the ACMA 
must take into account the effect on radiocommunications of 
issuing the licence. Class licences may be issued to manage 
the spectrum in bands not subject to spectrum licensing. It is a 
simple administrative matter for the regulator to authorise 
DSA technologies under apparatus or class licensing. The 
regulator may specify sharing conditions and technology 
standards to enable their effective use. 
Spectrum licences were established in the Act as a market-
based system of spectrum management. In order to provide 
explicit rights of spectrum access, coexistence of other 
licences over the same spectrum space as spectrum licences 
was very restricted. It was thus established as a pure property 
rights regime with no flexibility for the regulator to 
experiment with intermediate solutions. The regulator has 
little discretion to allow DSA technologies; they can only be 
introduced by agreement with the spectrum licensee.  
As mentioned above, there has been a marked reluctance by 
spectrum licensees to allow access by secondary users. This 
has the potential to severely restrict the efficient use of DSA 
technology over important parts of the spectrum. 
If Australia is to fully benefit from the transformational 
potential of DSA technologies, it will need a review of the 
legislative provisions surrounding spectrum licensing. This 
will be no easy task. Market-based reforms of spectrum 
management in Australia have been very successful on the 
whole. It will require ingenuity to develop a robust reform 
package that keeps the benefits of these reforms, while 
enabling the efficient use of DSA technologies. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Thanks to legislative reforms in the early 1990s, Australia 
already has much discretion in the design of its 
radiocommunications licences. However, this resilience was 
developed within the legal boundaries of a trichotomic 
licensing regime, not through the expanded discretion offered 
by a bespoke licensing approach. Some intermediary regimes, 
such as Flexi-eased C&C (a C&C ancestor to spectrum 
licences) have been used quite successfully. Other regimes, 
such as private parks and privately-run commons (offshoots of 
spectrum licences) are authorised regimes under the Act but 
have seen no or little action in practice. 
Potential regulatory solutions to the issues raised in this 
paper include wider adoption of intermediary regimes 
identified in the previous sections. Implementing these 
regimes with a set of ready-to-use DSA technologies could 
help resolve the stalemate between too much exclusivity (i.e. 
spectrum idleness issues) and excessive usage (i.e. quality of 
service issues). However, as discussed, some of these regimes 
are not yet authorised under the Act. Those intermediary 
regimes that could be implemented without legal amendments 
(e.g. the Private Parks) may need to be further promoted 
among stakeholders. Those regimes which are not authorised 
under the Act (e.g. enforced easement to spectrum-licensed 
spaces) may need the development of a new set of legislated 
rules.  
The more flexible, adaptable and responsive the regulatory 
framework, the better it will be in rising to the challenges that 
will increasingly confront spectrum policy makers. In turn, 
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this will improve the allocative, dynamic and technical 
efficiency of the radiofrequency spectrum. In particular, the 
development and implementation of a more sophisticated 
approach to licensing regimes will allow the effective and 
efficient exploitation of more sophisticated technologies such 
as DSA.  
To conclude, the Act was designed to provide an efficient 
regulatory regime for the conditions applicable or anticipated 
at the time it was passed in 1992. The Act has coped 
admirably with challenges that have arisen in the intervening 
18 years. However, it seems clear that a review of (at least) 
the licensing regimes established by the Act has the potential 
to significantly increase the efficient allocation and use of the 
radiofrequency spectrum in Australia by transformational 
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